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Abstract: The purpose of this study is to explore the effect of transfer pricing 
strategy and agency cost on financial reporting aggressiveness. This paper used 
61 manufacturing industries listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange from 2013 to 
2017 period among which 305 companies were selected by purposive sampling 
method to be studied. The research questions were tested using panel data 
regression analysis. This study found that transfer pricing strategy had no 
significant effect on financial reporting aggressiveness but agency cost had 
negative and significant effect on financial reporting aggressiveness. 
Furthermore, control variables as growth and return on asset had positive and 
significant effect on financial reporting aggressiveness while size had negative and 
significant effect on financial reporting aggressiveness. Results of this study 
indicated that managers did not use transfer pricing strategy in managing 
earnings because there was regulation of OECD to control manager behaviour in 
implementing transfer pricing strategy. In addition, agency cost was one of the 
important factors in reducing manager behaviour to meet their interests. 
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Introduction 
 
Aggressiveness of financial reporting is earnings management action taken 
by managers within or beyond the limits of applicable accounting 
principles (Frank, Lynch, & Rego, 2009). Watts and Zimmerman (1990) 
explained that one of the motivations for managers to aggressively 
engage in financial reporting is to obtain bonus/incentives, debt contracts, 
or political cost. Therefore, managers need to convince shareholders that 
their performance has been met through optimization of accounting profit 
figures. This condition results in managers trying to manage profits 
opportunistically to meet their interests. 
 
Several cases of financial reporting aggressiveness that occur in global 
companies prove that managers manage earnings to meet their interests, 
such as the case of Toshiba that occurred in 2015 (Sofyani & Rahma, 
2017). In addition to the Toshiba case, several cases of financial reporting 
aggressiveness have occurred globally, namely the Enron, Worldcom, 
Tyco, Health South, and Xerox cases (Ujiyantho & Pamungkas, 2007).  
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Cases of financial reporting aggressiveness do not only occurr in global companies, but 
also in Indonesian companies, such as the cases of PT. Kimia Farma, Tbk; PT. Indofarma, 
Tbk; PT. Lippo, Tbk; PT. Katarina Utana, Tbk; PT. Bumi Resources, Tbk; and PT. Ades 
Affindo, Tbk (Vajriyanti, Widanaputra, & Putri, 2015). These cases prove that the 
aggressiveness of financial reporting is still managers’ strategy in managing profits 
opportunistically to meet their interests. 
 
The aggressiveness of financial reporting action can be done through transfer pricing 
policies to manage earnings. In this case, the transfer pricing scheme carried out by 
managers is to set accounting profit figures as the managers wishes. The aim is to 
achieve the accounting profit target, so as to provide a positive signal to shareholders 
regarding the company's prospects. Scott (2015) stated that the manager's opportunistic 
policy to manage earnings is motivated by the amount of tax that is borne by the 
company, so that the tax burden owed becomes smaller as accounting profits have been 
set by the manager. 
 
Santosa and Suzan (2017) explained that transfer pricing is the price contained in each 
product or service from one division to another in the same company or between 
companies that have a special relationship. Transfer pricing is carried out by managers 
to manipulate accounting profit figures through transactions with parties that have a 
special relationship either through transactions with business groups that obtain tax 
holiday facilities, transfer profits to business groups that have suffered losses, as well as 
making transactions to business groups in tax-exempt countries or low tax rates. 
 
The Director of International Taxation in Indonesia stated that several companies in one 
business group in Indonesia tended to adopt a transfer pricing policy to multiply profits 
from one company to another that had smaller tax obligations. The method used in 
Indonesia for transfer pricing policies is, (1) transfer pricing transactions are carried out 
when there is one company in a business group that receives tax holiday facilities. This is 
done because companies that get tax holiday facilities do not have tax obligations, and 
(2) transfers a portion of profits to companies in a business group that records net 
losses. This condition is done because the company that loses has no tax obligations. 
 
The results of research conducted by Hwang, Chiou, & Wang (2013) shows that most 
transactions with related parties are arranged to meet the interests of managers. 
Beuselink and Deloof (2014) stated that business groups are more likely to be involved 
in aggressiveness of financial reporting than non-business groups. Rasheed, Abdul, & 
Mallikarjunappa (2018) and Marchini (2018) stated that the higher transfer pricing policy 
undertaken by related parties shows the higher aggressiveness of corporate financial 
reporting. Meanwhile, Ying and Wang (2013) showed that companies do aggressiveness 
in financial reporting followed by excessive tunneling to control shareholders in 
removing profits imported from companies that conduct IPOs. 
 
Aharony, Wang, and Yuan (2010) stated that many companies use related party 
transactions to improve company performance during the initial public offering (IPO) 
period. His findings prove that sales transactions with related parties are mostly used by 
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companies that conduct IPOs with the parent company to enable companies to regulate 
accounting profit figures, so they can affect the market, although this transaction can 
benefit the company. 
 
The transfer pricing policy that occurred in Indonesia caused the Indonesian government 
to issue Regulation of the Minister of Finance (PMK) Number 213 / PMK.03 / 2016 
regarding Additional Documents and / or Information that Must Be Stored by Taxpayers 
conducting Transactions with Parties with Special Relationships. This Regulation of the 
Minister of Finance (PMK) is an improvement to the Regulation of the Director General 
of Tax Number 23 / PJ / 2013 which regulates transfer pricing. This Regulation of the 
Minister of Finance (PMK) not only regulates the requirement for making additional 
transfer pricing documents for transactions with related parties that are abroad, but 
with related parties that are in the country. The purpose of the issuance of this 
regulation is to increase the transparency of the transfer pricing policy, so that this 
policy can minimize opportunistic managerial actions. 
 
One of the factors that can influence the behavior of company management in reducing 
the aggressiveness of financial reporting is the existence of agency costs used by 
companies in monitoring management behavior to suit the interests of shareholders. 
Agency costs are costs incurred by the principal to the agent to act in accordance with 
the interests of the principal. The aim is to reduce conflicts of interest between 
principals and agents. Agency costs incurred by the company, namely, (1) audit fees to 
control opportunistic managerial actions, (2) bonding costs to ensure that agents will 
not make decisions that are detrimental to the principal, and (3) residual loss as a result 
of manager decisions that should be able to optimize shareholder profits. This condition 
affects managers to reduce opportunistic behavior in managing company profits.  
 
Some previous research findings about the effect of transfer pricing and agency costs on 
financial reporting aggressiveness are the results of Rasheed et al. (2018), Marchini 
(2018), and Hwang et al. (2013) showed that transfer pricing has a positive and 
significant effect on management. In addition, the findings of Man, Locke, and Wellalage 
(2018) shows that agency costs negatively affect earnings management. The limited 
number of previous studies examining the effect of transfer pricing and agency costs on 
the aggressiveness of financial reporting shows that this research is important to be 
carried out by researchers. This is proven by the inconsistency of the findings of the 
previous research that has not been found. 
 
The contribution of this study is to fill the void of literature studies that examine the 
effect of transfer pricing and agency costs on the aggressiveness of financial reporting. 
In addition, this research can be used by various stakeholders in decision making. The 
effectiveness of regulations governing transfer pricing can reduce the opportunistic 
behavior of managers, as well as the existence of agency costs in order to reduce the 
aggressiveness of financial reporting. Based on this description, this study aims to 
examine the effect of transfer pricing and agency costs on the aggressiveness of 
financial reporting on manufacturing companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange 
(IDX) for the 2013-2017 period. 
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Literature Review and Hypotheses Development 
 
Agency Theory 
 
The capital market is an alternative for shareholders to invest in companies. That is, 
shareholders entrust their resources to be managed by the company. The aim is to 
increase shareholder prosperity in the future (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). However, the 
company or manager has their own motivation to fulfill their interests which causes a 
conflict of interest between shareholders and managers. 
 
Conflicts of interest experience significant developments between shareholders and 
managers when the motivation of managers is to get bonuses in fulfilling their interests. 
Ali and Hirshleifer (2017) explain that the opportunism of company managers shows 
that managers have the motivation to achieve profit targets and hide information that is 
less favorable for shareholders or the information conveyed by managers to 
shareholders does not indicate the actual condition. As a result of the conflict of 
interest, the shareholders try to suppress the manager's opportunistic behavior through 
monitoring mechanisms or compensation schemes, so that managers can meet the 
interests of shareholders. 
 
The impact of a conflict of interest is the emergence of agency costs. Agency costs are 
costs incurred to reduce conflicts of interest. Agency costs incurred by the company 
such as, (a) audit fees as a form of costs incurred to oversee the actions of company 
management to act in the interests of shareholders, (b) bonding costs as a form of 
guarantee that company management does not take profits based on the facilities 
obtained, and (c) costs to restore the company's reputation if the company's 
management does not manage the company well, giving rise to lawsuits. 
 
Financial reporting aggressiveness Financial accounting standards are designed to 
provide opportunities for company management to choose various alternative 
accounting methods in the financial reporting process. The aim is to adjust reporting of 
transactions and economic events according to the substance of transactions and 
industry practices, so as to improve the reliability of accounting information published 
by company management. However, the alternative flexibility of this accounting method 
is then used by company management to act opportunistically in managing earnings 
aggressively, called the aggressiveness of financial reporting. 
 
Frank et al. (2009) explain that the aggressiveness of financial reporting is earnings 
management actions taken by company management within or beyond the limits of 
applicable accounting principles. The aggressiveness of financial reporting is done 
intentionally by managers to meet the interests of managers. The aggressiveness of 
financial reporting is an implementation of company management decisions that are not 
in accordance with applicable standards (Schipper, 1999). The aggressiveness of 
financial reporting is carried out by company management because accounting 
standards are based on an accrual basis. That is, recognition of business transactions is 
based on the time the transaction occurred not when the cash is received. This allows 
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company management to manage the company's revenue, so that it will affect 
accounting profit figures. 
 
Transfer Pricing 
 
Transfer pricing is a classic phenomenon that often occurs in the field of taxation 
especially those relating to transactions with related parties or have special 
relationships. Santosa and Suzan (2017) explained that transfer pricing is the price 
contained in each product or service from one division that is transferred to another 
division within the same company or between companies that have a special 
relationship. Meanwhile, Suandy (2006) explained that transfer pricing is an act of 
allocating corporate entity profits in one country to another country's corporate entity 
in a group of companies aiming at reducing the corporate tax burden. 
 
The transfer pricing policy is carried out by companies that have special relationships or 
related parties. The purpose of transfer pricing is to manage the company's tax burden, 
so that corporate tax liabilities can be minimized. Lee, P, and Seo (2013) explained that 
there are two approaches in studying transfer pricing policies, namely, (1) the 
transaction efficiency hypothesis explains that related party transactions can be an 
efficient contracting tool under incomplete information conditions by reducing 
transaction costs (Williamson, 1975; Stein, 1997 ; Khana & Palepu, 1997; Shin & Park, 
1999), and (2) the conflict of interest hypothesis explains that related party transactions 
become dangerous practices arising from moral hazard. The conflict of interest 
hypothesis explains that related party transactions are carried out in the interests of 
controlling shareholders to take over the wealth of minority shareholders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). 
 
Agency Cost 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained that the delegation of authority from the principal 
to the managers causes the agent does not always act in accordance with the principal's 
interests. This happens because managers tend to behave opportunistically to fulfill 
their interests, resulting in conflicts of interest. This condition results in agency costs. 
Agency costs are costs that must be incurred by the principal to reduce conflicts of 
interest. Components of agency costs incurred by the company are (1) audit fees as a 
form of costs incurred to oversee the actions of company management to act in the 
interests of shareholders, (2) bonding costs as a form of guarantee that company 
management does not take profits based on the facilities obtained, and (3) costs to 
restore the company's reputation if the company's management does not manage the 
company well, giving rise to lawsuits. 
 
Hypotheses Development 
 
Agency theory explains the delegation of authority from the principal as the owner of 
the company to the agents or managers as the party managing the company influencing 
the information asymmetry between the principal and the agent. This happens because 
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the agent has the motivation to not act in accordance with the interests of the principal. 
This condition is caused by the opportunistic behavior of the managers to fulfill their 
interests (Shleifer & Vishny, 1997), so the principle of effort tries to reduce the 
managers’ opportunistic behavior through a monitoring mechanism. As a result of a 
conflict of interest, the principal is willing to bear agency costs (Jensen & Meckling, 
1976). Opportunistic behavior of managers is done through aggressive financial 
reporting actions. Frank et al. (2009) states that financial reporting aggressiveness is 
earnings management actions taken by company management within or beyond the 
limits of applicable accounting principles. 
 
The aggressiveness of financial reporting causes a bias in financial reporting because the 
financial statements do not reflect the actual condition of the company. Roychowdhury 
(2006) explained that the important reason managers do financial reporting 
aggressiveness is to avoid small profits, beat analyst estimates, and maintain company 
performance. Research Ding, Zhang, and Zhang (2007) showed that company managers 
conducted financial reporting aggressiveness through accrual or non-operating profit 
management of related party transactions or related parties. 
 
Aharony et al. (2010) explained that the purpose of the company is to use transactions 
with related parties to increase the company's profit during the initial public offering 
period. Sales transactions with related parties are mostly used by IPO companies and 
parent companies to enable companies to regulate profit figures in such a way that they 
can influence the market. In addition, Hwang et al. (2013) stated that most transactions 
with related parties are arranged to meet management objectives. Beuselink and Deloof 
(2014) stated that members of business groups tend to be involved in the 
aggressiveness of financial reporting compared to non-business groups. Research 
conducted by Ying and Wang (2013) showed that most companies conduct 
aggressiveness in financial reporting followed by excessive tunneling by controlling 
shareholders to remove profits imported from IPO companies. 
 
The results of the study of Rasheed et al. (2018) showed that transactions with related 
parties have a positive and significant effect on the aggressiveness of financial reporting. 
Consistent with Rasheed et al. (2018), the results of Marchini's research (2018), and 
Hwang et al. (2013) showed that transactions with related parties have a positive and 
significant effect on the aggressiveness of financial reporting. Based on the description, 
the hypothesis proposed in this study is as follows. 
 
H1 : Transfer pricing has a positive effect on the aggressiveness of financial reporting. 
 
 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explained that the delegation of authority from the principal 
to the agent causes the manager does not always act in accordance with the principal's 
interests. This happens because managers tend to behave opportunistically to fulfill 
their interests, resulting in conflicts of interest. As a result of conflicts of interest and 
asymmetry of information is the emergence of agency costs. Agency costs are costs that 
must be incurred by the principal to reduce conflicts of interest. Agency costs incurred 
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by the company such as, (a) audit fees as a form of costs incurred to oversee the actions 
of company management to act in the interests of shareholders, (b) bonding costs as a 
form of guarantee that company management does not take profits based on the 
facilities obtained, and (c) costs to restore the company's reputation if the company's 
management does not manage the company well, giving rise to lawsuits. 
 
Agency costs incurred by principals aim to suppress opportunistic managerial behavior 
in conducting financial reporting aggressiveness. Frank et al. (2009) stated that financial 
reporting aggressiveness is earnings management actions taken by managers within or 
outside the limits of applicable accounting principles. As a result, principals are willing to 
bear agency costs because the aggressiveness of financial reporting actions undertaken 
by managers can reduce the level of principal prosperity. Man et al. (2018) shows that 
agency costs negatively affect earnings management. Based on this description, this 
study proposes the following hypothesis. 
  
H2 : Agency cost negatively affects the aggressiveness of financial reporting. 
 
 
Research Method 
 
This study uses financial statements of manufacturing companies listed on Indonesia 
Stock Exchange (IDX) through the website www.idx.co.id. The sampling technique uses 
purposive sampling through criteria, namely, (1) manufacturing companies listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange during the 2013-2017 period, (2) publishing financial 
statements in rupiah, and (3) not having a negative profit (loss). Thus, this study 
obtained 61 companies, so there were 305 sample observations. 
 
This study uses three variables consisting of independent, dependent, and control 
variables. The independent variables are transfer pricing and agency costs, the 
dependent variable is the aggressiveness of financial reporting, and the control variables 
are company size, sales growth, and return on assets. The following are measurements 
of these three types of variables. 
 
Transfer Pricing 
 
Santosa and Suzan (2017) explained that transfer pricing is the price contained in each 
product or service from one division that is transferred to another division within the 
same company or between companies that have a special relationship. Measurement of 
transfer pricing uses related party transactions (RPT) (Kiswanto & Purwaningsih, 2014; 
Melmusi, 2016; and Nuradila & Wibowo, 2018). The formula used to measure transfer 
pricing is as follows. 
 
Related Party Transaction = 
Related Party Receivables ………………. (1) 
Total Accounts Receivable 
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Agency Cost 
 
Agency costs are costs incurred by the principal to the agent to act in accordance with 
the interests of the principal. This study uses the ratio of sales to total assets (STA) (Man 
et al., 2018; and Chen, Hu, Wang, & Tang, 2013) to measure agency costs. Man et al. 
(2018) explained that the low ratio of sales to total assets shows that the company's 
sales are bad because of poor managerial performance, so that agency costs get higher. 
In other words, the lower this ratio, the higher the agency costs. The formula used to 
measure agency costs is as follows. 
 
Agency Cost = 
Total Sales ………………. (2) 
Total Asset 
 
Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 
 
The aggressiveness of financial reporting is an act of earnings management carried out 
by managers within or outside the limits of applicable accounting principles (Frank et al., 
2009). This study uses a modified Jones model to detect the aggressiveness of financial 
reporting (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995). Following are the equations used to 
calculate the aggressiveness of financial reporting. 
 
 ...…. (3) 
 
    .….. (4) 
 
        ……. (5) 
 
The control variable uses company size, sales growth, and return on assets. The size of 
the company is obtained from the natural logarithm of total assets, sales growth is 
obtained from (sales-sales-1) / sales-1. Furthermore, return on assets is obtained from 
(profit / total assets). 
 
This study uses a panel data approach to estimate research hypotheses. Panel data is a 
combination of cross section data and time series (Winarno, 2015). Before making a 
regression estimate, this study will test the assumption of heteroscedasticity. Ghozali 
and Ratmono (2017) and Ekananda (2015) explain that white's cross-section 
heteroscedasticity can be used to correct parameter values obtained through OLS, so 
that it can be used as output in hypothesis testing. Furthermore, this study uses three 
panel data estimation methods namely, the common effect test, fixed effect, and 
random effect test to test the research hypothesis. In addition, this study also uses a 
paired test approach to determine the panel data estimation method that is suitable for 
testing the research hypotheses namely, the chow test, the multiplier lagrange test, and 
the hausman test. 
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Results and Discussion 
 
This study uses descriptive statistics to briefly describe the research variables. The 
following are descriptive statistics of research variables. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive Statistic 
Variables Mean Std. Deviation Observations 
Transfer Pricing 0.200497 0.295639 305 
Agency Cost 1.187859 0.526286 305 
Size 23.66719 5.204609 305 
Growth 0.090655 0.179618 305 
Return on Asset 0.097451 0.101206 305 
Financial Reporting Aggressiveness 0.022261 0.077765 305 
 
Table 1 shows that the average transfer pricing value is 0.200497. This value indicates 
that the average manufacturing company listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange in the 
2013-2017 period carried out transfer pricing of 20%. Agency costs are 1.187859 
indicating that the ratio of sales to assets of manufacturing companies during the 2013-
2017 period is high (more than 100%). 
 
The size of the company is 23,66719 using natural logarithms, so it is known that the 
average assets of manufacturing companies during the 2013-2017 period is 23,66719, 
sales growth is 0.090655, showing an average growth of 9%, and return on assets is 
0.097451 indicating the average availability of total assets to generate a 9% profit. 
Furthermore, the aggressiveness of financial reporting is 0.022261 indicating the 
average aggressiveness of financial statements in manufacturing companies during the 
2013-2017 period was 2%. This value indicates that the aggressiveness of financial 
reporting is still relatively low. The standard deviation value indicates the fluctuation of 
research variable data with the number of observations for the six variables is 305 
observations. 
 
Table 2 shows that the correlation between independent variables is less than 0.80. The 
results of this correlation prove that there is no multicollinearity in this research model. 
 
Table 2 Independent Variables Correlation 
 Transfer 
Pricing 
Agency 
Cost 
Size Growth Return 
on Asset 
Transfer Pricing 1.000000  
Agency Cost -0.015094 1.000000  
Size 0.107709 -0.026839 1.000000  
Growth 0.079287 0.255469 0.081401 1.000000  
Return on Asset -0.057347 0.471944 -
0.346711 
0.106919 1.000000 
 
Based on Table 3, it is concluded that a suitable method for estimating the effect of 
transfer pricing and agency costs on financial reporting aggressiveness is the fixed effect 
method (Sig. Cross-Section F, 0.0046 <0.05). 
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Tabel 3 Chow Test 
Effects Test Statistic d. f. Prob. 
Cross-section F 1.649491 (60.239) 0.0046 
Cross-section Chi-square  105.680031 60 0.0003 
 
Based on Table 4, it is concluded that a suitable method for estimating the effect of 
transfer pricing and agency costs on the aggressiveness of financial reporting is the 
random effect method (Sig. Breush-Pagan ie, 0.0000 <0.05). 
 
Table 4 Lagrange Multiplier Test 
 Test Hypothesis 
Cross-section Time Both 
Breusch-Pagan 1.346556 110.7699 112.1165 
(0.2459) (0.0000) (0.0000) 
 
Based on Table 5, it is concluded that the suitable method for estimating the effect of 
transfer pricing and agency costs on the aggressiveness of financial reporting is the fixed 
effect method (Sig. Cross-section ie, 0.0003 <0.05). 
 
Table 5 Hausman Test 
Test Summary Chi-Sq. Statistic Chi-Sq. d. f. Prob. 
Cross-section random 22.976114 5 0.0003 
 
Based on Table 6 of the paired test summary results, it is concluded that a suitable 
method for estimating the effect of transfer pricing and agency costs on the 
aggressiveness of financial reporting is the fixed effect method. 
 
Table 6 Summary of Panel Data Test Results 
No. Metode Pengujian Hasil 
1. Chow Test Common Effect vs Fixed Effect (If Prob. > 0.05, so 
the suitable method to apply is Common Effect and 
vice versa). 
 
Fixed Effect 
2. Lagrange 
Multiplier 
Test 
Common Effect vs Random Effect (If Prob. > 0.05, so 
the suitable method to apply is Common Effect and 
vice versa). 
 
Random 
Effect 
3. Hausman 
Test 
Fixed Effect vs Random Effect (If Prob. > 0.05, so the 
suitable method to apply is Random Effect and vice 
versa). 
 
Fixed Effect 
 
Table 7 shows the estimated results of the effect of transfer pricing and agency costs on 
the aggressiveness of financial reporting. The results showed that the effect of transfer 
pricing on the aggressiveness of financial reporting has a coefficient value of -0.004167, 
t-statistic is 0.039865, and the probability is 0.9168. This finding proves that transfer 
pricing has no significant effect on the aggressiveness of financial reporting. The 
existence of Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) No.213 / PMK.03 / 2016 regarding 
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additional documents and / or information that must be kept by taxpayers who conduct 
transactions with related parties which constitutes an improvement to the Regulation of 
the Director General of Tax No.23 / PJ / 2013 which regulates transfer pricing requires 
the creation of additional transfer pricing documents for transactions with related 
parties. The aim is to increase transparency regarding transfer pricing schemes. This 
condition causes management difficulties in managing earnings figures, so that transfer 
pricing cannot influence management to behave opportunistically in managing earnings. 
 
Table 7 Estimation of the Effect of Transfer Pricing and Agency Costs on Financial 
Reporting Aggressiveness 
Independent Variables and 
Control 
Fixed Effect 
Coefficient t-Statistic Prob. 
Transfer Pricing -0.004167 -0.039865 0.9168 
Agency Costs -0.049055 -4.210845 0.0000 
Size -0.011340 -2.012239 0.0453 
Growth 0.045502 2.181788 0.0301 
Return On Asset 0.515738 6.880017 0.0000 
Constant 0.295361 2.018044 0.0447 
F-Statistic 3.543303 
Prob (F-Statistic) 0.000000 
R
2
 0.490747 
Adjusted R
2
 0.352247 
Note: This model free of heteroscedasticity problems with white cross-section standard errors 
and covariance (d.f corrected) 
 
The results showed that the effect of agency costs on the aggressiveness of financial 
reporting had a coefficient value of -0.049055, t-statistic was -4.210845, and probability 
was 0.0000. This finding proves that agency costs have a negative and significant effect 
on the aggressiveness of financial reporting. Agency costs are costs incurred by the 
principal to the agent to act in accordance with the interests of the principal. The aim is 
to reduce conflicts of interest between principals and agents. Agency costs incurred by 
the company, namely, (1) audit fees to control opportunistic managerial actions, (2) 
bonding costs to ensure that agents will not make decisions that are detrimental to the 
principal, and (3) residual loss as a result of manager decisions that should be able to 
optimize shareholder profits. This condition affects managers to reduce opportunistic 
behavior in managing company profits. 
 
Average data shows that agency costs measured through comparison of sales with 
assets prove this ratio is high (more than 100%), the aggressiveness of financial 
reporting measured through discretionary accruals has a low average value of 2%. This 
data proves that when sales are high, agency costs are low. Low agency costs with low 
discretionary accruals prove that agency costs can directly mitigate the aggressiveness 
of financial reporting. This condition occurs because company managers tend to start 
switching to real earnings management compared to accrual earnings management that 
is easily detected by auditors (Roychowdhury, 2006). Return on assets and growth 
shows a positive and significant effect on the aggressiveness of financial reporting 
proving that managers use these two ratios as opportunities to conduct financial 
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reporting aggressiveness. That is, the higher this ratio gives the potential for managers 
to behave opportunistically in conducting financial reporting aggressiveness. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
The purpose of this study is to estimate the effect of transfer pricing and agency costs 
on the aggressiveness of financial reporting. The research sample uses manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period of 2013-2017. 
The results showed that transfer pricing had no significant effect on the aggressiveness 
of financial reporting. Meanwhile, agency costs have a negative and significant effect on 
the aggressiveness of financial reporting. The contribution of this research is through the 
Minister of Finance Regulation (PMK) No.213 / PMK.03 / 2016 regarding additional 
documents and / or information that must be kept by taxpayers who carry out 
transactions with related parties which is a refinement of Tax Director General 
Regulation No. 23 / PJ / 2013 can reduce the behavior of managers in managing earnings 
through transfer pricing schemes. Furthermore, conflicts of interest between principals 
and managers cause principals to incur agency costs to control opportunistic managers' 
actions. As a result, the prosperity of shareholders is reduced because of the company's 
financial burden. 
 
This study has several limitations, namely (1) the research sample uses manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX) for the period 2013-2017, so it 
cannot be generalized to companies outside the sample, and (2) measurement of 
transfer pricing using only related party transactions (RPT). Meanwhile, the 
measurement of financial reporting aggressiveness only uses the modified Jones model. 
Therefore, further research is expected to (1) use companies other than manufacturing 
such as mining to see the consistency of research results, and (2) measurement of 
transfer pricing and financial reporting aggressiveness using proxies other than related 
party transactions and modified Jones models. 
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